If thoughts are but chemicals resulting in ideas, then these are not reasons for believing in evil but simply what the brain is coming up with at the time. This is so hard for us to understand with natural reason because we live in a state where we feel the effects of original sin every day. For example we could say its essence is its chemical make up. Consider also the implications that the free will excuse seems to have for the Christian conception of heaven or vice versa. The conclusion is that it seems there is gratuitous evil, and therefore it seems no god exists. There are also direct punishments listed in Genesis for the fall, such as the pain of child birth.
I am not even sure these are included in Aquinas, if not them there would be no conflict, but if a god exists it could not be the Christian version. The problem with this approach, however, is that it concludes that there are no good reasons for these evils just because those reasons are not immediately apparent to us. In an interesting twist on the argument from design, Carrier turns the fine-tuning argument on its head, noting that several features of our universe--features predicted by naturalism--are highly improbable if Christian theism is true. It tells me they change. These are two possible theistic antecedents. The Anselmian God is maximally good and maximally great. But are all the premises true? This means that the explanation for the material cosmos must come from outside the material cosmos.
How are your feelings and thoughts justification for god and not justification for lying to avoid getting in trouble? But if some theists know that theism is true in virtue of religious experiences, say , then their theism is not subject to defeat by facts about suffering even disregarding these explanatory advantages. As you mentioned, we can't go back in time and figure this out exactly, but it is definitely not logically impossible for this to have been the case. Some of these are called natural evils, and they include things not caused by humans, such as hurricanes and cancer, that kill millions of creatures every year. If you want to say you know as a fact that Jesus rose from the dead, that's something that we can discuss as potentially a matter of fact. It is not actually gratuitous.
We can also speculate about the idea that before original sin, when we were united very closely to God, that even these natural evils were not present. I leave it as homework to the reader to try to come up with a more promising option. Everything works out for the best! Most thinkers, however, have found this argument too simple, since it does not recognize cases in which eliminating one evil causes another to arise or in which the existence of a particular evil entails some good state of affairs that morally outweighs it. How does this not lead to both normative skepticism and the impossibility to ever trust God? Therefore, God indirectly caused all the evil in the world. I don't know how specifically it would have been, but I believe that it was for a little while and could have endured.
The bad things in the world are like thorns or thistles. Think again of Elizabeth; now try to comprehend that the acts carried out on her by her own father are just infinitesimal drops of pain in the inconceivably vast ocean of suffering that we humans force upon one another. It exists as a rubber ball that can be melted. This is because evil has no existence in and of itself; evil is a privation of a good that ought to be present. The fire certainly serves a purpose in the health of a forest. He does a much better job explaining what I am attempting to explain! Check our and Are you planning to: click if any apply Recommended: , , , and. The idea that none of it could have been prevented by God without thereby losing some greater good seems an extraordinarily absurd idea, quite beyond belief.
Now consider how this sort of thing, as well as countless other instances of grotesque suffering, has been going on for hundreds of millions of years before human beings ever even arrived on the scene. In Aquinas' case it is the premise that there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. Which proposition do the facts about evil give us most reason to believe is true? Here we have only considered the cases of Ashley Jones and the fawn. Over time, layers upon layers of bat feces or guano build up underneath them, proving an ample and never-ending supply of nutrients for the creepy crawlers below such as cockroaches and other natural beauties. There is no such greater good.
And so on, there is nothing objective here. Obviously I am talking out my ass, but so are ÿou when you make claims about what the essence of unicorns is, or whether they are possible. So the problem of evil is not a logical problem that limits God's power or goodness in any way. Things exist in an actual way which also have certain potencies based upon their nature. The track of the falling meteor may look remarkably like a pillar of fire or, in other circumstances, a pillar of smoke. After all isn't that what you believe? But the sentence I quoted above is purely a matter of belief.
If either of these exist they would be a logical contradiction of ominpotence or omnibenevolence. Remember that Aquinas' arguments start from the world and reason about what must be necessary for the world to exist as it does right now. You would likely need a grand unified theory of physics, and scientific answers to things like, what dark energy is. It is commonly thought that the evil and suffering in our world constitutes strong evidence for atheism, the thesis that no omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God exists. I have no idea how you made the jump to justifying murder or theft from these statements. From chaos theory we can even understand fancifully, I admit how the mere flapping of butterfly wings could affect weather patterns. Who are we to say that anything at all happens without purpose? We have an overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrating our ability to deceive ourselves either because we really want to believe it or because we simply aren't comfortable not having an answer.
However, this criticism fails because the Problem of Evil works within the context of the theist's worldview, not the atheist's. It might not even be so much as giving up the entirety of that Gods goodness, as much as tweaking the argument to make all the crappy things part of God's good nature. The theist can accept the existence of suffering in God's creation while showing how Rowe's argument fails to explain why we should believe God would prevent it--given that Rowe is suggesting that it is not rational to believe in God on the basis that suffering exists. If on the other hand, we had a good argument for believing that there could be no good reason for an all loving God to allow suffering, any suffering would be proof against an all loving God. Likewise, if more than one god exists, the gods collectively are ignorant of suffering or are unwilling or unable to prevent it.
The spiritual history of the Catholic tradition supports the latter as well when we read the lives of the saints up and down the centuries. This is a defence of suffering on naturalism, not theism. This is an analogue of Singer's Greater Moral-Evil Principle, but a fortiori justified. Which can be used as evidence that we were right in step 1. In section I, Oppy considers how Christianity should be characterized, the best way to build a case against theism, and the nonrational reasons why people believe in God, among other things. It covers over the fact that a loving God does exist.